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INTRODUCTION
It is not surprising that a commercial culture would grant special con-
stitutional protection to commercial speech. There is, however, no reason
to suppose that special protection for commercial speech in our cultural
context promotes the overall freedom and well-being of the public. A
strong case can be made that in our culture, reducing the constitutional
protection of commercial speech would actually tend to promote freedom
and well-being in the long term. This is not because some commercial
speech is false, fraudulent, or deceptive. The focus of attention should
instead be on non-deceptive commercial speech, framed in the broader
context of our culture.
Because this Article's argument is broad in scope, it begins by estab-
lishing some perspective before focusing on the current case law of com-
mercial speech. Thus Section I below briefly surveys some of the classic
discussions of commodity consumption and well-being. The Article then
turns to the contemporary social science literature. This literature sug-
gests that for most contemporary Americans, there is actually only a mini-
mal relationship, if any, between consumption and well-being.
Section II discusses further the effects of commercial speech-in par-
ticular, the dominance, within its sphere, of commercialism in our cultural
context. Commodification and commercial speech are pervasive in our
society. Section II traces the implications of this state of affairs for free-
dom of speech generally.
Most important for free speech doctrine is the absence, in our cul-
ture, of any meaningful institutional challenge to the influence of com-
mercialism and commercial speech. No cultural institution is able, or
inclined, to provide significant "counterspeech" to the broad "message,"
intended or unintended, of commercial speech. Any reasonable regula-
tion of commercial speech, whatever its more particular justification, actu-
ally tends, at least minimally and indirectly, to contribute to freedom and
well-being. Such regulation has this effect by implicitly raising the issue of
the proper role of commercialism and commercial speech in our society.
There is, at a minimum, nothing in the Free Speech Clause that should
bar a society from democratically acting on these beliefs, along with any
other appropriate grounds for reasonably regulating commercial speech.
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This does not mean that government itself can be expected to coun-
terbalance the influence of commercialism, or that implicitly questioning
the cultural sovereignty of commercialism by itself establishes viable alter-
natives to commercialism. Reasonable regulation of commercial speech is
merely one step in the process of legitimizing and democratically facilitat-
ing free choices of less commercial styles of life, in ways consistent with the
Free Speech Clause and the rest of the Constitution.
With this basic argument in place, Section III surveys the most impor-
tant discussions of the constitutional status of commercial speech. The
commentators have been hopelessly split on whether or how to protect
specially commercial speech. This dispute stems largely from commenta-
tors' inclination to insist on either a broad or a narrow range of values or
purposes underlying the Free Speech Clause, and to define each of those
values or purposes in ways friendly or unfriendly to commercial speech.
This Article seeks to avoid this trap. One way of bypassing this intermina-
ble conflict is to adopt the broader cultural institutional focus I have intro-
duced above. Thus this Article does not rest on a narrow, controversial
view of why we value free speech in the first place.
To this point, I have relied on intuitive, uncontroversial ideas of the
meaning of commercial speech. Classifying speech as either commercial
or non-commercial often will be easy. But what if the idea of commercial
speech turns out to be so complex or contestable as to be unusable in
practice? Section IV is intended to allay such fears and offers a method for
minimizing the cost of judicial errors in misclassifying commercial and
non-commercial speech in borderline cases.
Section V then considers in some detail the case law establishing the
degree of special protection currently accorded commercial speech. As
matters stand, the constitutional tests imposed on regulations of commer-
cial speech are unreasonably demanding or, at best, so inescapably subjec-
tive and indeterminate as virtually to invite an unsympathetic court to
strike the regulation down. This state of the law does not serve the public
interest.
Finally, the Conclusion expands the theme of the preceding section,
warning that the level of protection currently given to commercial speech
jeopardizes reasonable regulation of that speech in a wide variety of sub-
ject matter areas. Whether the benefits of striking down reasonable regu-
lation of commercial speech in these areas outweigh the social costs of
doing so is, in our cultural context, doubtful in the extreme.
I. WELL-BEING AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH
The relationship between acquiring consumer goods and genuine
happiness or well-being has long been doubted. Classically, for example,
Epictetus argues that "if you have not the want of riches, know that you
possess more than this [rich] man possesses and what is worth much
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more."' Epictetus raises the possibility that the desire for riches and the
objects acquired from riches may be self-defeating and pathological. 2 Ep-
ictetus argues as well that the costs of consumption may take the form not
merely of the loss of leisure or some other consumer good or service, but
of an unintended, unforeseen change for the worse of one's character. 3 A
lifestyle emphasizing consumption is said to transform one's character ad-
versely, in ways that the consumer does not recognize even after the fact.4
Thus Epictetus denies that a lifestyle emphasizing consumption is typically
rational, in the sense of being chosen with conscious awareness of its most
important costs.
Skepticism as to the relation between consumption and happiness is
not unexpected in classical or medieval writers, but similar sentiments are
expressed from surprising quarters. Consider, for example, the observa-
tion of Adam Smith, a writer not insensitive to the power and virtues of
economic markets:
[W]ealth and greatness are mere trinkets of frivolous utility, no
more adapted for procuring ease of body or tranquility of mind
than the tweezer-cases of the lover of toys; and like them too,
more troublesome to the person who carries them about with
him than all the advantages they can afford him are
commodious. 5
Rousseau develops this theme in discussing the conversion of luxuries into"negative" necessities that have largely lost the power to please, but whose
absence creates unhappiness. 6 Following Rousseau's lead, Immanuel Kant
argues that "with growing wealth we acquire fresh wants, and the more we
satisfy them the keener becomes our appetites for more." 7 Henry David
Thoreau amplifies this theme in positing that "[m]ost of the luxuries, and
many of the so-called comforts of life, are not only not indispensable, but
positive hindrances to the elevation of mankind."8
Thoreau suggests two additional relevant points. First, his reference
to "so-called comforts" suggests with Rousseau that our inevitable adjust-
ment to a good means that we derive only diminishing satisfaction from
that good, while becoming more vulnerable to its loss and to whatever
1. THE DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS book IV, ch. 9, at 399 (George Long trans., A.L. Burt
ed. 1885); see also THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS book VII, § 15, at 126 (Arthur Waley trans.
1938) ("The Master said, He who seeks only coarse food to eat, water to drink and bent arm
for pillow, will without looking for it find happiness to boot.").
2. See THE DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS, supra note 1, at 399.
3. See id. at 400.
4. See id.
5. Adam Smith, Theory of the Moral Sentiments, in 1 BRIaSH MORAItSrS 309 (part IV, ch.
1) (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed. 1897) (Dover 1965).
6. JEANJ. RoussEAU, A DISCOURSE ON INEQUALIY part II, at 113 (Maurice W. Cranston
trans., Penguin 1984) (as commodities "degenerated into actual needs, being deprived of
them became much more cruel than the possession of them was sweet; and people were
unhappy in losing them without being happy in possessing them").
7. IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 7 (Louis Infield trans., Hackett 1992) (1930)
(citing Rousseau); see also STANLEY LEBERGOTT, PURSUING HAPPINESS 69 (1993) (quoting EMILE
DURKHEIM, SUICIDE 249 (1952)).
8. HENRY D. THOREAU, WALDEN AND OTHER WRITINGS 13 (Brooks Atkinson ed., Modem
Library 1950).
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disutility may attach to our fear for its loss. Thus Thoreau, Rousseau and
Kant hint at a loosely "addictive" quality of consumption. But Thoreau
does not see addiction as inevitable. Thoreau argues instead that once we
have obtained what is necessary for life, "there is another alternative than
to obtain the superfluities; and that is, to adventure on in life now, [one's]
vacation from humbler toil having commenced." 9 For Thoreau, the alter-
native to endless acquisition and consumption is not asceticism, self-de-
nial, or nirvana, but an affirmative, active use of one's liberation.
Early Marx was struck by the almost miraculous transformative powers
of wealth and the acquisitions made possible by wealth. 10 Marx was
equally interested in the ideas of authenticity and alienation in its various
forms. 1 Authentic, non-commodified bases and standards of human rela-
tionships and human standards may, in Marx's view, become historically
possible. Some of these themes have been developed by later writers
under the ambiguous 12 rubric of "commodity fetishism."13 In an informal
sense, commodity fetishism refers to the tendency for the sphere of mar-
ket exchange of goods and services to expand in ways destructive to the
fullest and highest development of personality.
It is possible that market transactions tend, at least among the imme-
diate parties, to in some sense maximize wealth. 14 The theorists of com-
modity fetishism may respond, however, that it is a further and fallacious
step to infer from this that human well-being in the broadest sense is most
fully realized when social relationships are converted into market-based
relationships, or when the logic of the commercial market affects the na-
ture of those social relationships.
A society's attempt to satisfy the full range of its needs through com-
modity exchange has been described as an aspect of the process of reifica-
9. Id. at 14; cf. Ralph W. Emerson, Thoreau, in THE OXFORD AuTHoRs: RALPH WALDO
EMERSON 475, 477 (Richard Poirier ed. 1990) ("He chose to be rich by making his wants
few."); WzuiAm WORDSWORTH, 1 THE POEMS 568 (John 0. Hayden ed., Penguin 1990) ("Get-
ting and spending, we lay waste our powers.").
10. KARL MARx, EARLY WRTnNGs 191-93 (T.B. Bottomore trans., 1964) (Third Economic
and Philosophical Manuscript).
11. See, e.g., id. at 192-94; cf. JAC QuEs Etu.ut, MONEY AND POWER 76-79 (LaVonne Neff
trans., 2d ed. 1984).
12. See MargaretJ. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. Rxv. 1849, 1872 n.85 (1987)
(referring to a non-technical sense of commodity fetishism in which one is said "to have one's
identity too tied to possessions, to be too dependent upon thing-ownership for pleasure and
a sense of self-worth"). We should, of course, recognize the increasingly important role of
commercial services as opposed to commercial goods in our culture. Consider purchases of
a wide range of advertised commercial services that in other cultures would be unnecessary
because of the depth of genuine friendships. In our culture, friendship may itself be com-
mercialized, and thereby impaired or tainted, or left undernourished.
13. Commodity fetishism in a non-technical sense has been identified simply as "the
continuing emphasis on 'transactions' under capitalism." William J. Wagner, The Contractual
Reallocation of Procreative Resources and Parental Rights: The Natural Endoument Critique, 41 CASE
W. REs. L. REv. 1, 148 n.654 (1990).
14. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech
and the Values of Free EApression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 429, 433 (1971) (maximum informa-
tion regarding competing products as necessary in order to maximize "material
satisfaction").
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tion.' 5 The reification of commodities, importantly, does not reflect the
conscious, knowledgeable decision or intention of individuals or of the
public collectively. It has been said that "[t]he commodity form... neces-
sarily functions independent of, or autonomously from, the will of the sub-
jects who set it in motion." 16 On this view, the commodity form, and the
role of commodity exchange, tend to take on lives of their own.' 7 To the
extent that this is so, persons can hardly be said to be sovereign, free, and
autonomous with regard to the scale and scope of commodity exchange.
Thus pervasive commodification is not simply the embodiment of free
choices. Equally importantly, though, commodification tends to be self-
justifying. The very pervasiveness of commodity exchange tends to make
any departure from commodity exchange as a way of fulfilling human
needs and potentials seem unnatural, utopian, or simply inconceivable.18
Thus the free market exchange of goods and services is not the unequivo-
cal embodiment of human development, human freedom, and fulfilled
intention.19
One should consider as well how the early capitalists described by
Max Weber, driven by other-worldly considerations, would have reacted to
the historical shift in focus from capital accumulation to consumption,
however inevitable such a shift may have been.2 0 By the early part of the
twentieth century, writers such as Thorstein Veblen 2 1 and R.H. Tawney22
deemed a significant portion of the production and consumption of
goods as "waste," not in the sense that such goods were unwanted, 23 but
that consumers had unnaturally learned to want such goods,24 even
though those goods did not genuinely serve human well-being.2 5
15. See GEORGE Lujkcs, HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS 91 (Rodney Livingstone
trans., 1971); see also HERBERT MARCUSE, NEGATIONS: ESSAYS IN CRITICAL THEORY 172-73 (er-
emyJ. Shapiro trans., 1968).
16. Isaac D. Balbus, Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the "Relative Autonomy" of
the Law, 11 LAw. & Soc'y REV. 571, 574 (1977) (emphasis deleted).
17. See id.; Marlin H. Smith, The Limits of Coyright: Property, Parody, and the Public Domain,
41 DUKE L.J. 1233, 1272 n.202 (quoting A DICTIONARY OF MARXIST THOUGHT 86-87 (Tom
Bottomore et al. eds., 1983)).
18. See Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of
Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 939, 991-92 (1985).
19. Cf MAX WEBER, 1 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 351 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
1978) ("[t]he various modes of want satisfaction, always the result of struggles between differ-
ent interests, often exert a far-reaching influence beyond their direct purpose").
20. See MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANr ETHmIC AND THE SPITrr OF CAPrrALISM 172 (Talcott
Parsons trans., Scribner's 1958); see also THOMAS S. ROBERTSON, CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 102
(1970).
21. See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (Mentor 1953) (1899).
22. See R.H. TAWNEY, THE ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY (1920).
23. See VEBLEN, supra note 21, at 78.
24. See id. at 69.
25. See id. at 78; TAwNEY, supra note 22, at 37-38.
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These themes were in turn developed byJohn Maynard Keynes2 6 and
at length byJohn Kenneth Galbraith.2 7 Nevertheless, it is still standard for
anyone trained in economics to think of consumer choices, in the absence
of force and fraud, as revealed free preferences, and to think of non-fraud-
ulent commercial speech as contributing to the efficiency of markets and
to wealth maximization.
The contemporary discussion of the relationships among consump-
tion, commercial speech, and well-being is addressed below, but it is useful
to bear in mind two preliminary points. First, it is not inconsistent for
someone to both wish to lead a life emphasizing consumption, and to be
chagrined or embarrassed if too many other people make the same
choice. By analogy, confining one's charitable donations exclusively to,
say, Amnesty International does not imply that one should be pleased if
everyone else does so as well. And second, we must not take the language
itself of free markets, freedom of commercial speech, and revealed prefer-
ences to mean that we need not examine the actual effects of those institu-
tions on human freedom, happiness, and well-being. Whether
contemporary commercial speech actually promotes freedom and well-
being is a partly normative and partly empirical question, and not simply a
matter of the definitions of free markets and commercial speech.
The relationships among commercial speech, consumption, happi-
ness, and freedom are doubtless complex. We may be tempted to think of
them as simply mutually supporting, without conflict. But we may also
suspect that matters may be more complicated than this, at least in today's
highly developed economies. The novelist and philosopher Iris Murdoch
argues, for example, that "modem industrial society, with all its vast diver-
sity of entertainments and mass of incoherent information (of which tele-
vision may serve as image and example), has radically changed people's
lives and mode of well-being, bringing some benefits and doing much
damage."28
An important link in the argument for the protection of commercial
speech, and of advertising in particular, is that such speech promotes
wealth maximization, and thus satisfaction and well-being. But the linkage
between wealth maximization and well-being or happiness, at least for our
society, in our time, should not be established merely by definition. Let us
then consider, for our culture, the evidence bearing upon the assumed
linkage between wealth, consumption, and well-being.
26. See John M. Keynes, Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren, in EssAYS IN PERSUA-
SION 358, 365 (1963) (referring to needs "which are relative in the sense that we feel them
only if their satisfaction lifts us above, makes us feel superior to, our fellows").
27. SeeJoHN K. GALarrI, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 120 (1958) ("Nothing in economics
so quickly marks an individual as incompetently trained as a disposition to remark on the
legitimacy of the desire for more food and the frivolity of the desire for a more elaborate
automobile."); see alSO JOHN K. GALBRAITH, THE CULTURE OF CONTENTMENT 8 (1992) ("One
may marvel at the attraction of often frivolous and dispensable consumer artifacts and enter-
tainments in our time, but their ultimately controlling appeal cannot be doubted.").
28. IRs MURDOCH, METAPHYSICS AS A GUIDE TO MORALS 372 (1992).
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In some respects, it might be improper to treat wealth or income as
an adequate proxy for consumer spending. But given the remarkably low
contemporary American private savings rate2 and the evidence that over
90% of American incomes are devoted to consumption,3 0 it seems reason-
able to draw upon the literature discussing the relation between income
or wealth and reported happiness.
For many economists, voluntary consumption of non-defective goods
is not the beginning, but the end of any inquiry into the relationship be-
tween consumption and happiness.3 ' This approach in turn reinforces
the process by which "the market culture teaches us that money is the
source of well-being."3 2 Many of us suppose that we would be significantly
happier, over the long term, if we were able to afford to buy some particu-
lar set of commodities. Based on the available social science evidence,
however, this belief is likely wrong.
It has been observed, for example, that "[wihile GNP and material
standards of life have advanced substantially in the post-World War II de-
cades, the extent of happiness and the rate of subjective satisfactions have
not."3 3 In particular, real income rose quite substantially in the United
States in the period from 1957 to 1973, but reported levels of satisfaction
declined slightly during this period.3 4 During this same period, interest-
ingly, the percentage of those describing themselves as "very happy" stead-
ily decreased, and this decrease was most evident among the most
affluent.3 5
It is tempting to dismiss these findings as largely a reflection of
unique historical events. Naturally, it may be thought, a pre-Sputnik
America would, all else equal, be happier than a post-Vietnam era
America. To this, several replies may be made. First, the trends referred
to above have not reversed themselves in the years following 1973.36 As
the data is extended in time, it becomes increasingly difficult to dismiss as
aberrant or artifactual. Second, trying to explain the data on reported
happiness in terms of broader cultural and historical events comes peril-
ously close to undermining, rather than rescuing, the notion that wealth
and consumption lead to happiness. And finally, the weak, limited rela-
tionship between income or expenditures and happiness is supported
from a number of angles.
29. See generally THE U.S. SAVINGS CHALLENGE: PoLIcv OrIONS FOR PRODUCTIVrrY AND
GROWTH (Charles E. Walker et al. eds., 1990); LAWRENcE H. SUMMERS & CHRIS CARROLL, WHY
Is U.S. NATIONAL SAVING So Low? (1987).
30. See LEBERGOTr, supra note 7, at 65.
31. See Robert E. Lane, Does Money Buy Happiness?, 113 PUB. INT. 56, 61 (1993).
32. 1L
33. GEORGE KATONA, PSYCHOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 363 (1975).
34. See RONALD INGLEHART, THE SILENr REVOLUTION 116 (1977).
35. See Angus Campbell, Subjective Measures of Well-Being, 31 Am. PSYCHOLOGISTr 117, 118
(1976).
36. See Alan T. Durning, Are We Happy Yet? How the Pursuit of Happiness is Failing, 27
Frrums-r 20, 21 (1993) (percentage of those reporting themselves as "very happy" fluctuating
but stable at roughly one-third since the mid-1950s).
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In fact, there is evidence suggesting that the linkage between income
and happiness is growing weaker over time in the United States.3 7 In any
event, a number of surveys illustrate the weak relationship between money
and happiness. 38 The evidence extends far beyond the American context.
Robert Lane concludes, for example, that "[i] n almost all developed coun-
tries there is no substantial relation between income and well-being."39
And the evidence in the American context can be particularized. For ex-
ample, a 1973 study indicated that despite regional differences in income,
when Southern state residents are "asked to evaluate the quality of their
lives, they are modestly but consistently more positive than people living in
the other major regions of the country."40 A survey of 22 large lottery
winners "found no clear difference between their happiness and that of
controls."41 Nor does wealth tend to be associated with reduction in the
amount of worrying; instead, "it simply changes the subject"4 2 of the
worrying.
As a general rule, then, with some qualifications, happiness does not
appear to be strongly linked with income and wealth, or, presumably, con-
sumer expenditures guided, facilitated, or prompted by commercial
speech. Turning from survey data to introspection confirms key elements
of this conclusion. The philosopher James Griffin observes that "[i]t is
depressingly common that when even some of our strongest and most cen-
tral desires are fulfilled, we are no better, even worse, off."43
As we have seen, the typical inability of consumption to generate last-
ing satisfaction has been variously diagnosed. When discussing consump-
tion-based lifestyles, contemporary writers tend, again consistent with
introspection, to recur to concepts such as self-defeatingness 44 and the
"hedonic treadmill," 45 to the phenomenon of being trapped,4 6 and of be-
ing "addicted."4 7 This literature thus helps quantify or make more precise
the observations of some of the historical writers discussed above. Thus,
for example, based upon his important survey work, the political scientist
Ronald Inglehart concludes that "[w]hile increased prosperity may pro-
duce a short-term sense of gratification, an individual gradually adjusts his
aspiration level to his external circumstances; after a certain time lag, one
takes a given level of prosperity for granted and aspires to more." 48 This
result should not be surprising.
37. See MICHAEL ARGYLE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HAPPINESS 94 (1987).
38. See id. at 93 (citing several studies).
39. Lane, supra note 31, at 57.
40. Campbell, supra note 35, at 118.
41. ARGYLE, supra note 37, at 97.
42. Lane, supra note 31, at 60.
43. JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING 10 (1986).
44. See, e.g., Richard A. Easterlin, Does Money Buy Happiness?, 30 PuB. INrEREs-r 3, 10
(1973).
45. Id.; Lane, supra note 31, at 63.
46. Easterlin, supra note 44, at 10.
47. Id.; TIBOR ScrrovsKy, HuMAN DESIRE AND ECONOMIC SATISFACTION 118 (1986).
48. INGLEHART, supra note 34, at 147.
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If getting and spending, perhaps via commercial speech, does not sig-
nificantly affect happiness, there are stronger influences on happiness.
The evidence suggests that happiness is more crucially affected, generally,
by "social relations, work, and leisure."49 These sources of satisfaction
often do not depend upon market-based consumption of goods and serv-
ices.50 Nor, for that matter, do we tend to find genuine friendship, appro-
priately stimulating work, and leisure in general to parallel consumption
as an entrapping, self-defeating "treadmill."5 1 If wealth is subject to the
law of diminishing returns, 52 genuine friendship does not seem to be simi-
larly vulnerable.5 3
Admittedly, it is not easy to measure attributes like the "quality" of
work or friendship in a rigorous way. But measurement problems do not
obscure the basic message. Incidentally, the evidence seems to suggest
that "informal visits between neighbors and friends, family conversation,
and time spent at family meals have all diminished in the United States
since mid-century,"5 4 though this may have been offset by more interest-
ing work for some persons.
Why we remain on the hedonic treadmill need not be fully answered
here. It may be that at least some relationships, creative work, and pro-
ductive, potentially enjoyable leisure activity require investments, initial
sacrifices, or training which we are now unable or unwilling to under-
take.5 5 But a more important explanation, it would seem, for remaining
on the hedonic treadmill may be more broadly institutional, with commer-
cial speech at the heart of that explanation.
Before taking up the broader role of commercial speech in our cul-
tural context, though, one should acknowledge the possibility that the
genuinely poor, whether conceived of as a relatively poor nation-state, or
as a segment of a particular society, would be significantly better off at
higher consumption levels, or would, more particularly, be happier as a
result of uninhibited non-deceptive commercial speech.
As it turns out, there is some controversy over whether poor societies
are significantly unhappier than rich societies.5 6 In any event, as the
United States presumably does not fall into the former category, broadly
increasing our collective happiness through additional consumer spend-
ing seems unlikely. More interesting is the relationship between income
and happiness among the poor within our own society. This precise ques-
49. Durning, supra note 36, at 20; see also Lane, supra note 31, at 63.
50. See Scrrovsw, supra note 47, at 119; see also Sut Jhally, Commercial Culture, Collective
Values and the Future, 71 TEX. L. REV. 805, 809 (1993) ("[A] market-based society has a ten-
dency to push people towards those things that it can provide-goods and services-while
the real sources of satisfaction are outside the capability of the marketplace to provide.").
51. See Lane, supra note 31, at 63.
52. See, e.g., Ruut Veenhoven, National Wealth and Individual Happiness, in UNDERSTAND-
INC ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 9, 19 (Klaus G. Grunert & Folke Olander eds., 1989).
53. See Lane, supra note 31, at 63.
54. Durning, supra note 36, at 22.
55. See ScrrovsKy, supra note 47, at 123.
56. Compare, e.g., Lane, supra note 31, at 56-57 and sources cited therein with AaRGam,
supra note 37, at 94 and Easterlin, supra note 44 (work is re-examined in Lane, supra note 31).
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tion must be kept in perspective. We plainly ought to take relief of poverty
far more seriously than we do, whether this would be politically popular or
not. This is a matter of justice and basic moral principle quite independ-
ent of survey evidence of subjective satisfaction among the poor.5 7
With this understanding, it is certainly plausible to argue that the de-
clining marginal utility of wealth 58 is of scant relevance to the poor, and
that money can at least reduce some forms of brute distress, such as reliev-
ing cold or hunger.59 It is thus not surprising that people in poverty
within our society tend to report greater unhappiness.60
Assuming, then, some negative correlation between poverty within
the United States and happiness, the question for our purposes then be-
comes whether the poor can be made significantly happier through a re-
gime of specially constitutionally protected commercial speech. In some
respects, this is a difficult question. But we must not lose sight of the obvi-
ous. A poor person benefits far more from a warm coat than from com-
mercial speech about coats, even when the indirect benefits of
unrestricted commercial speech in enhancing quality and driving down
prices are considered.
Doubtless the poor may, to take one example, benefit from prescrip-
tion drug price advertising, directly or indirectly, at least under some
health insurance and welfare policies. But there are costs for the poor as
well. It is possible that prescription drug price advertising may affect the
commercial viability of small, independent pharmacies owned by persons
with a long-term stake in a poor community. There may be some tradeoff
between price and the availability of a pharmacist with ties to the poor
community who is able and inclined to treat the local poor as individuals,
who knows their broader needs, and who can establish the kind of per-
sonal, caring relationship of the sort that existing evidence suggests is im-
portant to happiness. 6 '
As well, we must consider that as constitutional protection for com-
mercial speech increases, so may the potential for commercial speech to
manipulate and distract the poor, without violating whatever restrictions
may exist on fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading commercial speech.
Along with useful information about accessible goods in accessible places
comes the broader, phantasmagorical effects of contemporary advertising
as well.
57. See, e.g., KA.r, supra note 7, at 42-43.
58. See Veenhoven, supra note 52, at 19.
59. See ARctYL, supra note 37, at 93.
60. See id. at 94; Lane, supra note 31, at 57; Campbell, supra note 35, at 121.
61. See generally Durning, supra note 36 and Lane, supra note 31 and accompanying text.
For discussion of similar issues without special reference to the poor, see the several opinions
in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
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I. THE EFFECTs OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH
One need not deny the beneficial effects of commercial speech gen-
erally or of advertising in particular. However maldistributed wealth may
be, there is plainly more of it, in some obvious sense, in a materialist-ori-
ented consumer economy.62 Commercial speech, including various forms
of advertising, obviously plays a significant role in this process. This dis-
cussion does not minimize the plight of the poor, who plainly are better
off with consumer goods such as clothing and food.6 3 More broadly, the
society as a whole clearly benefits from rapid dissemination of accurate
information concerning, for example, a safe and uniquely effective drug
treatment for a serious illness. 64
As well, it is difficult to deny the adverse consequences on wages and
employment if many of us tomorrow abandoned familiar consumption
levels in favor of communing with nature or verse composition. 6 5 Of
course, my proposal to accord no special constitutional protection to com-
mercial speech does not seem likely to lead to any such consequences.
Those persons who eventually discover themselves in possession of excess
income and wealth may reasonably be advised to enhance the effective
market demand of the poor.
Nor should we deny that the very activity of searching for, selecting,
and acquiring commercial goods and services may itself be utility-enhanc-
ing.66 On the contrary, "it is a cliche to say that the best way to deal with
being depressed is to go shopping."6 7 Whether this is actually the best
path to well-being seems, however, given the evidence and analyses dis-
cussed above, 6 rather doubtful. Or so a reasonable government might
come to believe.
Neither is it necessary for us to endorse any distinction between natu-
ral, healthy, and authentic consumer needs and artificial, unhealthy, or
contrived consumer needs.69 To some degree, as Jean Baudrillard has ar-
gued, modem advertising often tends to break down any traditional dis-
tinction between authentic and contrived, artificial responses to
advertisements. 70 It might be noted, though, that if any distinction be-
tween natural and contrived responses to advertising tends to dissolve, it
62. See KATONA, supra note 33, at 363.
63. See, e.g., ERICH FROMM, THE REVOLUTION OF HOPE: TOWARD A HUMANIZED TECHNOL-
oGY 120 (Ruth N. Anshen ed., 1968).
64. See Keith B. Leffler, Persuasion or Information? The Economics of Prescription Drug Adver-
tising, 24 J.L. & ECON. 45, 74 (1981).
65. See FROMM, supra note 63, at 131.
66. See CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN: PROGRESS AND ITS CRrTCS
521-22 (1991) [hereinafter LASCH, THE TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN]. But see ROBERT E. LANE,
THE MARKET EXPERIENCE 469 (1991).
67. Stuart Ewen, Advertising and the Development of Consuh er Society, in CULTURAL Poirrcs
IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 82, 85 (Ian Angus & Sut Jhally eds., 1989).
68. See supra text accompanying notes 1-61.
69. See, e.g., FROMM, supra note 63, at 124; JERRY MANDER, FOUR ARGUMENTS FOR THE
ELIMINATION OF TELEVISION 125 (1978) (citing, perhaps controversially, an electric hair dryer
as a contrived, artificial, implanted need).
70. SeeJean Baudrillard, The Masses: The Implosion of the Social in the Media, 16 NEW LITER-
ARY HISTORY 577, 578-79 (Marie McLean trans., 1985).
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may become more difficult to specify how commercial speech distinctively
serves any of the values typically thought to underlie the free speech
clause. 7 1 If, for example, our responses to ads tend to be neither classi-
cally manipulated nor authentic, it may be hard to say why that murky
state of affairs is most consistent with genuine autonomy.
Finally, we need not ascribe to commercial speech, and to commer-
cial advertising in particular, powers they do not possess. Plainly, neither
particular advertisements nor broader ad campaigns are invariably effec-
tive. It is reported, for example, that "about 70% of test-market brands are
not expanded nationally and can therefore be classed as failures." 72 The
ability of advertising to influence choice among competing brands often
does not translate into effective influence over whether one buys that gen-
eral kind of good at all. 73 And even when advertising affects behavior, the
effect may well be temporary.74
None of this implies, however, that commercial advertising is without
significant, long-term, intended or unintended effects on American cul-
ture and decisionmaking. It is admittedly true that advertisements often
compete against each other,75 with one product's gain being another
product's loss. But the proliferation of ads does not amount simply to a
process of mutual annihilation. Importantly, advertisements that conflict
or compete at one level may, at another level, mutually reinforce one an-
other. Such effects need not be intended or even recognized. Consider,
by way of loose analogy, that in the natural world, two or more separate
waves may mutually interfere or tend to cancel each other if they arrive
out of phase, or they may tend to reinforce one another,76 thereby in
some respect heightening their potential impact.
At a fairly specific level, an ad for a particular drug, as "reinforced" by
other ads for competing and non-competing drugs, may tend in our cul-
tural context to promote drug ingestion more generally as a response to
medical, psychological, and even social problems. As one former partici-
pant in the process has written, "[w]hile it might matter to Upjohn or
Cutter Laboratories which drug a consumer buys, both are in agreement
that they benefit whenever people seek any drug rather than a nondrug
solution to a problem." 77 More precisely, though, this mutual reinforce-
71. See infra note 78; see also Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce & Commu-
nication, 71 TEx. L. REv. 697, 712 (1993) (noting commercial ads have "helped devalue the
coin of communication by developing a massive, unthinking tolerance for nonsense" (quot-
ing LEo BOGART, STRATEGY IN ADVERTISING 7 (2d ed. NTC Business Books 1984) (1967))).
72. J. Hugh Davidson, Why Most New Consumer Brands Fai HARv. Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr.
1976, at 117; see also MICHAEL NovA , THE SPi-rI OF DEMOCRATIC CAPrrTALsM 108 (1982)
("The history of advertising is full of quirks and failures.").
73. TIBOR ScrrovsKy, THE JOYLESS ECONOMY 205 (1976).
74. See Lester D. Taylor & Daniel Weiserbs, Advertising and the Aggregate Consumption
Function, 62 Am. ECON. REv. 642, 650 (1972).
75. NovAK, supra note 72, at 108.
76. E.g., NICK HERBERT, QuANruM REALI=y 74 (1985).
77. MANnER, supra note 69, at 126.
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ment and "generalization" process would seem to operate whether it is
intended or even recognized by any party, including the audience. 78
More broadly, even when commercial ads compete, or fail to sell a
particular product, they may at least inadvertently, through their mutually
reinforced cumulative impact, legitimize and support commercial con-
sumption as a style of life and a solution to life's problems.79 Thus it is
only a harmless exaggeration to say that " [a] dvertising serves not so much
to advertise products as to promote consumption as a style of life."80
Thus while consumers reject or ignore most of the particularized ad
messages they receive, as would inevitably be the case, they may be less
able to resist the unintended broader "message" of the superiority of com-
mercial consumption as a basic approach to living.8 ' This assumption re-
flects a realistic assessment of the contemporary balance of cultural forces.
Consider that one writer has estimated that by the age of retirement, the
typical American will have seen at least two million television commer-
cials.8 2 This is a remarkable figure. Children's television programming,
where basic preferences might be formed, commonly seeks to merge sub-
stantive programming and commercial huckstering.8 3 The vector of
forces tending to engender commercial consumption is, plainly, powerful.
By itself, the power of commercial speech to shape inadvertently our
culture might not be so troubling, were it not for the fact that today, in
our cultural context, there is no realistic prospect for effective "counter-
speech" tending to promote noncommercial approaches to life's problems
and opportunities. In our cultural circumstances, no institution currently
devotes any real energy or resources to provide a counterspeech remedy 4
for the implicit message of our commercial culture.8 5 Of course, some
78. Actually, the case for restricting commercial speech is additionally strengthened to
the degree that the typical ad does not reflect an actual intent to promote an ethos of materi-
alism or consumption, or any other broadly social idea. See, e.g., R. GEORGE WRIGHT, THE
FUTURE OF FREE SPEECH LAw 1-31 (1990).
79. See Durning, supra note 36, at 22.
80. CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NAROissisM 137 (1979) [hereinafter LASCH,
THE CULTURE]; see also LASCH, THE TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN, supra note 66, at 518.
81. See Ewen, supra note 67, at 83. Again, it is possible that the expansion of commer-
cialism tends to promote the atrophy of the most non-commercial elements of other cultural
institutions.
82. NEIL PosTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH 126 (1985); see also Collins & Skover,
supra note 71, at 707 (noting twelve billion display ads, 2.5 million radio ads, and 300 thou-
sand television commercials generated each day; average person spends one and a half years
watching commercials).
83. SeeJAMES B. TwrrcHELL, CARNIVAL CULTURE 246-47 (1992) (arguing that children's
television cartoons are essentially a merchandising medium); see also Ellen Edwards, The Chil-
dren's Half-Hour: Hostage to Toy Makers?, WASH. POST, June 10, 1994, at Al (arguing that chil-
dren's television is driven by toymakers).
84. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (ex-
plaining that prohibition of free speech is dangerous and not to be done to avert merely
trivial harms), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969).
85. See LAscH, THE CULTURE, supra note 80, at 140 (arguing that teachers pacify students
by making school painless); LEBERGOTr, supra note 7, at 34-35 (arguing that Western culture
maximizes pleasure as a goal); Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Psychology of First
Amendment Scholarship: A Reply, 71 TEx. L. REV. 819, 826 (1993) (quoting LEo BOGART, STRAT-
EGY IN ADVERTISING 107 (2d ed. 1984)).
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elements of many cultural institutions speak, albeit softly or occasionally,
against consumption-oriented styles of life. But even their message is
often mixed, and it is overridden by the broader culture.
This is a thesis about the sustained balance of cultural institutional
forces. It is admittedly not a theme the correctness of which can be
demonstrated to a skeptic by a few footnote citations. Its plausibility is
presumably widely accepted, and the evidence for its truth can be derived
from a mere glance at our contemporary culture. As well, some portion of
those who have urged special constitutional protection for commercial
speech may find my basic thesis regarding the current institutional role of
commercial speech to be plausible and important, and thus reconsider
their position on the constitutional protection of commercial speech.
This is not to argue the more controversial thesis that genuine free-
dom of speech requires at least rough equality of resources among con-
tending forces.8 6 All one need argue is that in our current cultural
circumstances, no single cultural institution, or set of such institutions, is
either inclined to, or able to, provide any substantial "countervailing"
speech to counteract the broad, reinforced influence, whether intended
or not, of commercial advertising speech. A "bias," in the sense of a dis-
tinct vector of cultural institutional forces, toward some form of consump-
tion of commercial goods and services clearly characterizes our day.87 Of
course, some persons are less affected by this cultural bias than others, but
this would be true of even the most dominant cultural tendencies in any
society.
One should take a moment, though, to consider a possible objection
to, or extension of, the argument thus far. Perhaps one might argue that a
parallel analysis could be developed for the political sphere, and particu-
larly for the case of competing electoral candidates of opposing ideologies
or parties. Isn't it possible that even genuinely competing electoral candi-
dates may, like some waves in the natural world, or like most commercial
advertising speech, tend perhaps unintentionally to reinforce certain basic
political themes, so as to "bias" public thinking, perhaps in ways not re-
sponded to by other institutions?
Certainly, a debate continually dominated by one range of ideologies
or parties may tend, even unintentionally, to delegitimize other political
options. But for our present purposes, there are important disanalogies
between contemporary electoral competition and the competition of the
marketplace. A casual examination suggests that most commercial ads in
86. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (holding that to restrict speech of
some elements in society to enhance voice of others is "wholly foreign to the First Amend-
ment"); see also Paul Brest, Further Beyond the Republican Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism,
97 YALE L.J. 1623, 1627 (1988);J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?,
85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976) (analyzing Buckley and Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments
of 1974).
87. The language of "bias" in this respect is drawn from FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL. LIMITS TO
GROWTH 84 (1976). Note that this bias need not be toward "conspicuous" consumption or
toward the most expensive affordable goods and services. There may well be fluctuations in a
society's consumption patterns over time from the exotic to the plain and functional. See also
Holly Brubach, Sackcloth and Ashes, 67 NEw YORKER, Feb. 3, 1992, at 78.
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all media do not refer invidiously to any competitor's good or service, let
alone to all significant competitors. Where ads are comparative, they are
often done with a light touch. There is rarely any implication that any
competitor's product or service is, in any absolute sense, shoddy, danger-
ous, or not of value in the abstract.
In the electoral realm, however, invidious comparisons are com-
mon,88 even increasingly so.89 While the effects of "negative" or "attack"
ads in political campaigns may be complex and difficult to track,90 such
ads often repel the public, contributing to voter disenchantment, apathy,
cynicism, and low voter turnout.9 1 Certainly, there is a greater sense con-
veyed that one's electoral opponent is affirmatively unworthy or harmful
than is typically conveyed in the commercial context. Thus electoral
speech by competing candidates may not be as typically mutually reinforc-
ing as in the case of commercial ads.
Of course, this is not to deny that the constant exposition of main-
stream political ideologies tends to make alternative perspectives seem im-
plausible or inconceivable; this is a central problem in democratic theory.
This problem, however, need not be resolved here. Instead, the reader is
invited to accept either of two views. First, that mainstream political
speech tends, at least by omission, to unreasonably stigmatize some or all
non-mainstream political speech and that in the name of equality or free-
dom, the government should do something about this. Or second, that
there is a significant difference between the ways in which commercial
speech marginalizes non-commercial attitudes and the ways in which
mainstream political speech marginalizes non-mainstream political views,
such that it is reasonable to regulate commercial speech in ways unaccept-
able in the realm of political speech. On either of these views, the argu-
ment for the reasonable regulation of commercial speech can go forward.
Nor is it correct to think of all commercial ads as propositional. As
any investigation suggests, advertising has undergone qualitative change
over time.92 Many, though hardly all, contemporary ads are largely
imagistic or atmospheric, or seek to link a product with a mood, a celeb-
rity, or a somehow assumedly appealing non-celebrity, without proposition
88. See, e.g., Neal J. Roese & Gerald N. Sande, Backlash Effects in Attack Politics, 23 J. AP-
PLIED Soc. PSYcHOL. 632, 651 (1993) (arguing that politicians frequently resort to a discus-
sion of emotional issues).
89. See Sharyne Merritt, Negative Political Advertising: Some Empirical Findings, 13 J. ADVER-
"rISING 27-28 (1984); Ruth Shalit, The Oppo Boom: Smearing for Profit Takes Off, NEw REPUBLIC,
Jan. 3, 1994, at 16; see also Campaigns in the Muck, USA TODAY, Feb. 18, 1994, at Al (increased
negative campaigning anticipated by political consultants for 1994).
90. See Gina M. Garramone, Voter Responses to Negative Political Ads, 61 JouRNAISM Q. 250
(1984) (arguing that backlash is most common effect of negative advertising); Merritt, supra
note 89, at 37 (admitting that study was limited due to focus on only one election); Roese &
Sande, supra note 88.
91. See Merritt, supra note 89, at 37; Roese & Sande, supra note 88, at 651. For broader
discussion, see generally KAREN S.JOHNSON-CARTEE & GARYA. COPELAND, NEGATIVE POLI-rCAL
ADVERISING: COMING OF AGE (1991).
92. See RAYMOND WILuAMS, TELEVISION: TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURAL FORM 68 (1974)
(arguing that television, as it evolves, is allowing people to experience educational processes
rather than just being taught about the processes).
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or promise.93 Such ads are neither true nor false, and neither descriptive
nor misleading in the traditional sense.9 4 While some modern ads may
perhaps be thought of as "semihypnotic and irrational"95 by design, and
others as traditionally propositional, many contemporary ads are non-
propositional.
To the extent that freedom of speech is a matter of a search for some
propositional truth, protecting ads that do not implicate truth or falsity is
in that respect misguided. Such ads are neither fraudulent, deceptive,
misleading, nor the opposite, thus cohering poorly or not at all with some
of the categories and criteria by which the Supreme Court examines such
speech. 9 6
Of course, not all commercial speech disdains truth and falsity. More
broadly, regulation of contemporary commercial speech raises interesting
issues of genuine freedom of speech and of freedom in general. The
point of reasonable restrictions on commercial speech is not, however, to
flatly prohibit underlying transactions between commercial sellers and po-
tential buyers. 97 In our cultural context, the effects of reasonable regula-
tion of commercial speech on freedom are more subtle.
It is important, for example, not to confuse "diversity of product
choice with diversity of life-style or thoughts."9 8 Having a choice among
brands or products would be a poor sort of freedom if one's culture left
one unable to take less consumption-oriented alternatives seriously. More
particularly, to the extent that we participate in consumption fads on the
basis of popularity, or "bandwagon" effects, 99 we are neither choosing au-
tonomously, nor achieving any genuinely worthy community, especially
between generations. 10 0
More insidiously, over the long term, in a cultural context in which
consumption is a dominant and only ineffectively challenged theme,
largely unregulated speech on behalf of consumer goods and services may
93. See PosrmAN, supra note 82, at 127 (commercial ads as increasingly non-
propositional).
94. See Ju.Es HENRY, CULTURE AcANsr MAN 47 (1963); MARK POSTER, THE MODE OF
INFORMATION 59 (1990) (discussing the work of Jean Baudrillard); see also supra note 70 and
accompanying text; Todd F. Simon, Defining Commercial Speech: A Focus on Process Rather Than
Content, 20 NEw ENG. L. Rav. 215, 239 (1985) (arguing that non-objective advertising is "in-
herently unverifiable").
95. FROMM, supra note 63, at 123; Bailey Kuklin, Sef-Paternalism in the Marketplace, 60 U.
CrN. L. REv. 649, 649 (1992).
96. See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 340 (1986)
(citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)).
97. See KATONA, supra note 33, at 376 (questioning Fromm's assertion that the consumer
is passive and questioning the need for legal restrictions on advertising); NovAy, supra note
72, at 108; ScrrovsKy, supra note 47, at 126 (arguing that although consumer stimulation is
expensive, the proper remedy does not include denying the stimulus to the consumer).
98. MANER, supra note 69, at 125.
99. See HARvEY LEIBENSTEIN, BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN: A NEW FOUNDATION FOR
MICROEcONomics 48-49 (1976) (defining "bandwagon effect" as "the desire to join the
crowd").
100. See generally Robert D. Putnam, The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public
Life, 13 AM. PROSPECT 35 (1993). See alsoJhally, supra note 50, at 813 (commercial culture as
discouraging bonds with future generations).
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tend to change our basic tastes, capacities, and judgments10 1 in ways we do
not anticipate or even recognize. Some of these changes, such as increas-
ingly demanding standards for product warranties, may well be benign.
Others, however, such as loss of capacity to value, to enjoy, or even to
envision non-market solutions to problems, are not.10 2 To claim that a
"free market" in non-deceptive commercial speech makes us genuinely
freer thus raises, at a minimum, serious problems of measurement and
commensurability. Why must a democratic society interpret its constitu-
tion to bias the choice in the commercial direction if that society wishes to
maximize the most valuable sorts of freedom?
To illustrate this general problem, let us consider, almost at random,
one particular scenario. With regard to a typical consumer good, the in-
terests of producers and consumers may both be served, via expansion of
market and economies of scale, if consumer tastes regarding a product
can be modified in the direction of some homogeneous fairly low com-
mon denominator. 10 3 There need be nothing narrowly or classically de-
ceptive or coercive about this taste modification process, in the sense that
no literal force or fraud is applied. Jazz or classical music, say, is still in
some sense available, but is widely found to be genuinely unpalatable. Ad-
mittedly, in utilitarian terms, consumers may well gain from even rather
intensive development of this process, at least in some sense. But the price
in freedom may be high.
True, one must grant that freedom in general and freedom of speech
are hardly equivalent. But for our immediate purposes, the most relevant
commonly cited purpose or value underlying freedom of speech is that of"self-realization," or the development and flourishing of the personal-
ity. 10 4 The dubious effect of largely unregulated commercial speech on
consumers' genuine self-realization means that such speech may actually
undermine the purposes of free speech as much as it may undermine free-
dom more generally.
Thus, even setting aside all cases of false or otherwise deceptive com-
mercial speech, it is far from clear that freedom in general, or at least
freedom of speech, is unequivocally maximized by special constitutional
protection for commercial speech. What tips the balance, again, is a real-
istic assessment of contemporary institutional forces and the absence of
any real institutional capacity for, or interest in, challenging the domi-
nance of the culture of commercial speech.
101. See ScrrovsKy, supra note 73, at 5 (arguing that the theory that consumers know what
is best for them is unscientific and inaccurate).
102. See id.; see also Allan C. Hutchinson, More Talk: Against Constitutionalizing (Commercial)
Speech, 17 CAN. Bus. L.J. 2, 15 (1990) ("a commercially saturated atmosphere" as tending to
"trivialize and impoverish democratic politics").
103. See Scrrovsmz, supra note 73, at 9 (arguing that sellers cater to the "desires everybody
shares").
104. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and
Redish's The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. Ra,. 646 (1982); RobertJ. Sharpe, A Comment on
Allan Hutchinson's Money Talk: Against Constitutionalizing Commercial Speech, 17 CAN. Bus. L.J.
35, 39 (1990).
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As matters stand, any reasonable governmental restriction on com-
mercial speech thus serves, if only minimally, to reduce the degree of cul-
tural institutional bias105 in favor of a commercial speech-guided culture
of consumption. Whether such restrictions on commercial speech tend,
in the aggregate, to promote genuine happiness, freedom, or human dig-
nity by reducing that bias should be left to reasonable democratic deci-
sionmaking. It is then up to the society to take other necessary steps
toward legitimizing or encouraging less commercial ways of life, consistent
with the Constitution and other democratic policy preferences.
III. COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND THE VALUES UNDERLYING FREEDOM OF
SPEECH
The question of whether, or how stringently, to protect constitution-
ally commercial speech has proved remarkably resistant to consensus. Per-
haps symbolically, the leading modern free speech theorist, John Stuart
Mill, was obviously ambivalent as to the level of protection properly to be
accorded some forms of commercial speech. 106 Contemporary writers
are, if not individually ambivalent, at least mutually divided.10 7
One broad camp favors some degree of special First Amendment pro-
tection for commercial speech.' 0 8 Writers in this camp recognize that
many commercial ads they would protect are less propositional than
imagistic or symbolic, but they note that such ads may promote distinctive
lifestyles, such as materialism or hedonistic consumption, as might fully
protected non-commercial speech. 10 9 Failure to protect commercial
speech may, according to some, even be dangerous. Such failure to pro-
tect commercial speech fully may, it is said, provide government with "a
powerful weapon to suppress or control speech by classifying it as merely
commercial."" 10
In contrast, there is a broad group of writers more skeptical of the
need for special protection for commercial speech."' In this camp, it is
sometimes argued that special protection for commercial speech may en-
105. For broader background, see Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure 71 IowA L.
REv. 1405, 1425 (1986) ("Contemporary social structure will, if left to itself, skew public
debate.").
106. SeeJOHN STUART MIL, ON LIBERTY 168-69 (Penguin ed. 1974) (1859).
107. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital Mar-
kets, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 5, 6-9 (1989) (providing a broad typology of approaches to the consti-
tutional status of commercial speech).
108. See, e.g., Leading Cases of the 1992 Supreme Court Term, 107 HAv. L. REv. 144, 225
(1993) (stating that the Supreme Court "continues to leave 'commercial speech' with insuffi-
cient protection").
109. See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for
Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. Rav. 777, 791 (1993).
110. Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627,
653 (1990).
111. See, e.g., Joshua Cohen, Freedom of Expression, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 207, 237 (1993)
(commercial speech as allegedly less closely connected with "expressive" interests than is
political speech); Alvin I. Goldman, Epistemic Paternalism: Communication Control in Law and
Society, 88J. PHIL. 113, 128 (1991) (asserting that "an unregulated marketplace of ideas seems
essential for political speech but not for commercial speech").
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danger, rather than strengthen, protection for political speech, on the
grounds that such a policy might, over time, erode any public conviction
of the core value of freedom of speech. 112 Alternatively, it has been ar-
gued that commercial speech generates fewer "external" benefits uncap-
tured by the speaker than does political speech."13
Typically this battle is played out, quite inconclusively, over the rela-
tionship between commercial speech and one or more of the values or
purposes thought to underlie special protection for free speech. Perhaps
the basic problem in this regard is that "[i]n a pluralistic, heterogeneous
society, such as ours, people disagree sharply over the needs, interests, and
desires that give rise to the evaluative points of the First Amendment tax-
onomy of worth."1 14
Thus it has been argued that commercial speech is either unre-
lated,11 5 or at best differently linked, 116 to the values thought to underlie
the Free Speech Clause. Not surprisingly, the contrary also has been ar-
gued, on various grounds. Commercial speech, it is argued, typically ex-
presses "ideas and values."' 1 7 Professor Burt Neuborne has observed that"abandoning protected commercial speech altogether denies consumers
access to valuable information."1 18 Michael Perry has argued for protec-
tion of commercial speech under what he calls the "democratic" and "epi-
stemic" conceptions of free speech."a 9 Writers such as Martin Redish 120
and Daniel Farber 12 1 have noted the artistic value of at least some com-
mercial advertisements.
This sort of persistent, apparently unresolvable controversy is paral-
leled by the debate over the relationship between commercial speech and
the more particular value of self-realization. Some writers have argued
112. See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L.
REv. 449, 486 (1985).
113. See Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SuvioLK U. L. Ra,. 1,
39-40 (1986). Of course, to the extent that commercial speech, or advertising in particular,
helps to generate a culture of commodity consumption, such speech may create external
effects, both positive and, as we have suggested, negative.
114. Heidi L. Feldman, Objectivity in Legal Judgment, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1187, 1241 (1994).
115. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the
Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299, 353 (1978) (noting the public's interest
in commercial speech messages as "totally irrelevant to first amendment values").
116. See Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CAL. L. REv.
422, 460 (1980) ("Commercial speech does not promote the underlying values of the system
in the same manner as does other expression.").
117. Ronald D. Rotunda, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL.
L. F. 1080, 1091.
118. Burt Neuborne, A Rationale For Protecting and Regulating Commercial Speech, 46 BROOK.
L. Rav. 437, 440 (1980); see also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) ("The First Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based
on the informational function of advertising."); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783
(1978).
119. MichaelJ. Perry, Freedom of Expression: An Essay on Theory and Doctrine, 78 Nw. U. L.
Rav. 1137, 1171-72 (1984).
120. Redish, supra note 14, at 431.
121. Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 372,
384 (1979).
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that commercial speech typically promotes self-realization, 122 while others
are more skeptical on this score.1 23 This debate remains unresolvable
largely because of ambiguity surrounding ideas such as self-expression and
autonomy.124 Roughly, self-realization in the sense of acting as one hap-
pens to wish with respect to receiving commercial messages is obviously
promoted by freedom of commercial speech. In contrast, if we think of
self-realization in terms of human dignity or the highest development of
the human personality, the connection between commercial speech and
such self-realization will seem much more dubious. Whether unregulated
non-deceptive commercial speech promotes self-realization in the sense of
happiness or subjective well-being has been controversial, but as we have
seen above, 125 available evidence suggests that it does not.
In this context, little is gained by insisting upon a controversially nar-
row view of free speech values. Perhaps the leading exponent of such an
approach is C. Edwin Baker. Professor Baker argues that "interpretations
of the free speech clause should focus on the liberty or freedom of the
speaker"1 26 as opposed to that of any actual or potential audience. As
Professor Baker then develops the argument, corporations-or more par-
ticularly, non-household-oriented, non-media corporations other than la-
bor unions-fall outside the scope of the Free Speech Clause.1 27 This is
because such corporations are, in a competitive market, structurally
bound to pursue profit in some relevantly constrained, determinate way
that sufficiently explains their speech, and cannot otherwise pursue truth,
anyone's self-realization, or freedom. 128
Each of the necessary steps in Professor Baker's subtle and complex
argument will be plausible to some. But the combined controversiality of
those steps leads one to suspect that the argument is acceptable only to a
subset of those already disposed to deny special constitutional protection
to commercial speech. Given the overall stringency of Professor Baker's
premises, his theory is of only limited use in persuading those who are
agnostic on the question of protecting commercial speech.
122. See, e.g., David F. McGowan, A Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 CAL. L. REv.
359, 361 (1990); Kenton F. Machina, Freedom ofExpression in Commerce, 3 L. & PHIL. 375 (1984)
(arguing for full protection for commercial speech on "autonomy" grounds).
123. See, e.g., Michael Davis, The Special Resiliency of Commercial Speech as Deus Ex Machina, 6
L. & PHIL. 121 (1987) (replying to Machina, supra note 122); Thomas H. Jackson & John C.
Jeffries,Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Proces and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. Rv. 1, 14
(1979) (asserting "commercial speech has no apparent connection with the idea of individ-
ual self-fulfillment").
124. See, e.g., NicHoIAs WOLFSON, CORPORATE Fis-r AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND THE SEC 63
(1990) (linking the ideas of self-expression, human dignity, and autonomy).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 1-61.
126. C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REv.
1, 4 (1976).
127. See id. at 13, 28, 40.
128. See id. For further relevant discussion by Professor Baker, see C. Edwin Baker, Adver-
tising and a Democratic Press, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 2097, 2232-33 (1992) (expanded in C. EDWIN
BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PREss (1994)). Of course, structural constraints may
be a sufficient explanation for speech without being necessary to explain the speech, which
may have other sufficient motivations.
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More generally, theorists' understandable focus on whether, or to
what extent, commercial speech promotes the values thought to underlie
the Free Speech Clause has been unproductive because of the equivocality
and controversial nature of the concepts involved. It is largely because of
this methodological dead end that one takes a different tack. First, the
widely presumed linkage between typical commercial speech and freedom
or happiness is in doubt. Second, the practical irrelevance of "counter-
speech" responses to commercial speech in a cultural context in which no
institution is either able or inclined to provide any such challenge on a
meaningful scale is noted.
IV. COMMERCIAL AND NoN-COMMERCIAL SPEECH
To this point, we have set aside the question of a precise, maximally
useful definition of commercial speech, relying instead on uncontroversial
examples. A precise and widely useful definition, allowing courts or other
persons to classify easily and uncontroversially instances of speech into
commercial or noncommercial may well not be possible. But one may at
least provide some reason for believing that ambiguities in the idea of
commercial speech will not commonly generate implausible or seriously
harmful results.
In this respect, the Supreme Court has been of limited assistance.1 2 9
The leading commercial speech case, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,130 referred to "speech which does 'no
more than propose a commercial transaction.' "131 On the other hand,
the Court has also, in the influential case of Central Hudson Gas &. Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission,'3 2 referred to "expression related solely
to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience."1 3 3
Apart from their inconsistency, these two definitions of commercial
speech are useful only in particular contexts. Consider first the "no more
than propose a commercial transaction" approach. Intuitively, commer-
cial speech may involve more than merely a proposal without losing its
commercial character. This definition may serve in contexts of commer-
cial advertising, securities offerings, and other areas, as long as nothing
hangs on the fact that this definition itself does not specify what is meant
by 'commercial.' But other intuitively commercial forms of speech, such
as many proxy statements, corporate financial statements, reports to share-
holders, commercial contracts, product safety brochures, warranties, prod-
uct labels, and so on do not fit neatly within the category of "proposals."13 4
129. See David F. McGowan, supra note 122, at 400-02 (discussing and critiquing judicial
inconsistency in defining the scope of commercial speech).
130. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
131. Id. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)); see also Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989).
132. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
133. Id. at 561.
134. See Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a General
Theory of the First Amendment 78 Nw. U. L. REx. 1212, 1214 (1983).
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On the other hand, the "solely economic interests" approach to defin-
ing commercial speech may include some instances of commercial speech
beyond mere proposals, but it also leaves out much that is ordinarily con-
sidered commercial speech. 13 5 Consider, for example, the central exam-
ple of a typical commercial advertisement for a perfume, an elaborate
exercise machine, a hair replacement technique, cigarettes, or athletic
shoes. Now, these and similar ads may relate in part to the economic in-
terests of producers and consumers. Far more is at stake, however, than"solely"136 economic interests in the purchase of these and many other
products and services.
These definitions are thus in certain respects less than ideal. But no
simple, invariably helpful alternative definition seems attainable. It has
been declared that "the doctrine of commercial speech rests on a clean
distinction between the market for ideas and the market for goods and
services." 13 7 This approach is useful in certain respects. It is helpful, for
example, in reminding us of the important truth that often speech about
markets, generally or in particular, and especially speech about whether or
how such markets should be regulated, transcends commercial speech.
Plainly, though, markets for ideas, however we reasonably define
"ideas," and markets for goods and services are not mutually exclusive. It
is not difficult to imagine that authors and publishers of all sorts of books
propounding ideas may be in part motivated by a quest for profit, as, in
turn, may many of the book's purchasers.13 8 Inquiring into the degree, or
the causal necessity, of profit motivation on a case-by-case basis is obviously
problematic.
No simple distinction between the markets for ideas and for goods
and services is thus possible. But this does not mean that the distinction is
useless for all purposes, or that no serviceable distinction between com-
mercial and noncommercial speech is possible. Commercial speech can
be a viable category even if it has no "essence." Professor Christopher
Stone has observed that "[w]e may be able to find nothing better than
'family resemblances' among members of the commercial speech set."13 9
One is at least able to distinguish commercial speech well enough to
justify treating commercial speech differently from political speech. The
most important reasons for this differential treatment have been set forth
at some length above. 140 But a bit more may be said to enhance interest
in the distinction. Professor Ronald Coase wonders why governments
should be deemed generally more competent to regulate commercial than
135. See id. at 1222.
136. See supra text accompanying note 133.
137. Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 123, at 2; see aLso Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (declaring that "advertising pure and simple" is clearly
within the bounds of commercial speech).
138. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 159-60 (1982) (de-
clining to include all profit-motivated speech within the category of commercial speech).
139. Christopher D. Stone, Theorizing Commercial Speech, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. REv. 95, 113
(1988).
140. See supra sections I-I1.
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political speech. 14 1 If Professor Coase is right, much of the fuss over dis-
tinguishing commercial and political speech would seem misplaced.
But this skepticism is itself misplaced. No doubt some government
regulation of commercial speech is really driven by an enterprise's desire
to impose restrictions on entry by potential competitors, by a wish to un-
justly discriminate, or by a range of other anticompetitive motivations. 142
But this is hardly the whole story, and it is implausible to imagine that a
particular government can be equally trusted to regulate fairly its own rival
political parties, movements, and ideologies along with commercial enter-
prises and commercial speech.
The point may be put this way: it is at least plausible in some cases
that we are better off protecting unpopular political ideas, perhaps for the
sake of promoting an ethos of tolerance.1 43 On the other hand, few1 44
would argue that we are better off, even in the long run, legally protecting
the advertisement of latently dangerous products and relying on the tort
system, Consumer Reports, and the possibility of criminalizing the produc-
tion of the goods themselves to minimize the carnage. Banning an obvi-
ous carcinogen and banning an allegedly harmful political party require
entirely different justifications.
This is not to minimize the potential for abuse of the government's
power to regulate commercial speech. But such abuse can be reduced by
means other than specially protecting commercial speech. Most, if not all,
denunciations of an enterprise's attempt to reduce competition by induc-
ing the government to restrict commercial speech are themselves fully pro-
tected political speech. Any government actions reducing competition by
restricting commercial speech should be subject to a judicial test of rea-
sonableness under the Free Speech, Equal Protection, and Due Process
Clauses. 145 Any restrictions of commercial speech that are, for example,
racially invidious 146 should be subjected to the most stringent judicial
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.1 47
There is thus no reason to suppose that permitting reasonable gov-
ernment regulation of even non-deceptive commercial speech could not,
at least over the long term, provide significant net social benefits. But we
must do what we reasonably can to prevent political or other socially valua-
ble kinds of speech from being inadvertently swept into the net of com-
mercial speech regulation.
141. See R.H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6J. LEC.AL STU. 1, 2 (1977); see also Alex
Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-Histoy of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REv.
747, 751-52 (1993); Fred S. McChesney, Commercial Speech in the Professions: The Supreme Court's
Unanswered Questions and Questionable Answers, 134 U. PA. L REV. 45 (1985).
142. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Commercial Speech, Constitutionalism, Collective Choice, 56 U.
CIN. L. REv. 1317, 1361-62 (1988); David A. Strauss, Constitutional Protection for Commercial
Speech: Some Lessons from the American Experienc, 17 CAN. Bus. L.J. 45, 45 (1990) (emphasizing
speech regulation as a possible cover for discrimination).
143. See generally LEE BOLLtNGER, THE ToLERANT SocaEw (1986).
144. But see HERBERT SPENCER, THE MAN VERSUS THE STATE (Eric Mack ed. 1982) (1884).
145. Cf Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
146. See Strauss, supra note 142, at 45.
147. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
1994]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
It is not difficult to think of cases that test the classificatory boundary
of political and commercial speech: a cigarette manufacturer's corporate
support of the Bill of Rights,148 or a clothing manufacturer's advertised
stance on social issues. 14 9 Ironically, some ads may even play off the pub-
lic perception of the fraying of many social relationships, offering con-
sumption-oriented solutions.1 50 A desperately poor person who is
reduced to begging may engage in commercial or political speech, or
both. 15 1 A magazine such as Consumer Reports may seek to guide consumer
purchases, but with no financial stake in the recommended goods and
services.152 Presumably scientifically based health claims may be made on
behalf of particular products, sometimes in the context of an otherwise
purely commercial ad. 153
However, it is important not to overestimate the scope and severity of
these sorts of arguable borderline cases. Most typical advertisements will
be classified as commercial speech on any reasonable theory. Most speak-
ers, on the other hand, who wish primarily to convey a political message
can readily avoid entanglement with the problem of commercial speech
on any reasonable definition. Thus the costs of misclassifying political or
commercial speech are likely limited.
In particular kinds of cases, special considerations may play a role in
classifying an instance of speech as commercial or non-commercial. Con-
sider, for example, a claim that egg yolks are nutritionally beneficial, de-
spite or because of their cholesterol content. Some courts may wish to
distinguish between proponents of such a claim based not on the presence
or absence of a pecuniary stake, but on a broader consideration of what
reactions would logically please the particular speaker. A scientist who
sees special nutritional benefit in egg yolks presumably wants people to
actually eat, rather than merely buy, the eggs. An egg producer who
makes the same claim, on the other hand, may or may not care what pur-
chasers of eggs actually do with them, and may be most pleased by pur-
chasers who buy eggs, throw them away, and then buy more.
There is no guarantee that some acceptable shortcut method for de-
ciding particular close cases will always be available. On the other hand,
approaches are available to reduce the costs, if not the risk, of misdeciding
genuinely close cases. For example, courts faced with a close classification
148. See Leo Bogart, Freedom to Know or Freedom to Say, 71 Tax. L. REv. 815, 816 n.5
(1993).
149. Brubach, supra note 87, at 78; see also LAscH, THE CULTURE, supra note 80, at 139
(discussing the phenomenon of advertisements attempting, reasonably or otherwise, to link
themselves to the idea of freedom).
150. See Ewen, supra note 67, at 93.
151. See Loper v. New York City Police Dept., 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993); Young v. New
York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990).
152. See T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 519, 541 (1979) (Consumer Reports entitled to full free speech protection).
153. See Martin H. Redish, Product Health Claims and the First Amendment: Scientific Expres-
sion and the Twilight Zone of Commercial Speech, 43 V ND. L. REv. 1433 (1990) (arguing for
protection of scientific health claims in the context of commercial advertising); see also Na-
tional Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977).
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problem may notice that speakers may have some antecedent control over
their own destiny. At least some speakers are easily able, if they choose, to
formulate what they wish to say in a way that makes their speech as clearly
non-commercial as reasonably possible under the circumstances.
Courts may thus wish to establish a reasonable and socially desirable
incentive for speakers who fear their speech may be classified commercial.
A judicial rule might take something approaching the following form: in
genuinely close, borderline cases only, the court may wish to protect spe-
cially speech where the speaker came as close as reasonably possible,
under the circumstances, to presenting the speech in question as clearly
non-commercial. What is "reasonably possible" must be considered in
light of the speaker's own resources and capacities, as well as the speaker's
interests in not sending a distorted or insincere message, or in addressing
an undesired audience. 154
Thus in borderline cases of commercial speech, the courts should
look to the range of speech alternatives antecedently available to the
speaker, and determine whether more clearly non-commercial speech al-
ternatives were essentially ignored. For example, a court might point out
to a store that it is not difficult to express one's views as to the Fourth of
July without also describing items for sale on that occasion in lavish detail.
Perhaps in cases on the border of commercial and non-commercial
speech, more can be realistically asked of major corporations1 55 than of
the destitute.156
V. INTERMEDIATE-LEVEL PROTECrION AS ExCESsIVE PROTECTION FOR
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Currently, the Supreme Court majority seems to accept the idea of
according commercial speech, in at least some cases,1 5 7 some lesser de-
gree of constitutional protection than is given to political or other fully
protected speech. The basic contours of the current constitutional test for
regulating commercial speech were set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Elec-
tric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,'5 8 which concerned regulation of the
promotion of electricity consumption, for the sake of energy conservation.
There, the Court established a four-part test that begins by specifying that
the speech at issue:
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we
must ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substan-
154. For a more elaborate exposition of this theme in a related context, see generally R.
George Wright, Speech an Matters of Public Interest and Concern, 37 DEPAUL L. REv. 27 (1987).
155. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983) ("Advertisers
should not be permitted to immunize false or misleading product information from govern-
ment regulation simply by including references to public issues.").
156. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1798 (1993) (referring to "an intermedi-
ate standard of review"); Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989); In re Primus, 436
U.S. 412, 435 (1978) (toleration of more imprecise regulation of commercial than of polit-
ical speech); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
158. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
1994]
DENVER LWIvESITY LAW REVIEW
tial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental inter-
est asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is neces-
sary to serve that interest.159
In practice, the Central Hudson test is problematic because it erects obsta-
cles to reasonable regulation of purely commercial speech at every turn.
The test invites constitutional challenges to such regulations on grounds
so vague and open-ended as, in many cases, to encourage the expression
of mere subjective judicial preference. Let us consider the elements, and
complications, of the Central Hudson test in turn.
It is important to bear in mind that the general burden of proof in
these cases is on the government. 16 However useful this burden place-
ment may be in political speech cases, in the commercial speech context it
tends to undermine reasonable government regulation at every stage of
the Central Hudson test.
Consider first the test's invitation to the government to prove that the
speech at issue is "misleading."161 However familiar the idea of "mislead-
ingness" may seem, in practice its application is often complex and inde-
terminate. With regard to commercial speech, typically, "[t]he line
between truth and falsity ... is hardly crystal clear." 162 More broadly,
cases suggest that "verification is very difficult in both the political speech
and the commercial speech areas." 163
The problem here is in part that typical commercial claims may be,
even if in some sense true, deceptive or misleading to some persons to
some degree. 164 The court is thus required to decide what degree of de-
ception, of what number of persons, with what sorts of arguable conse-
quences, is required before the speech will be labeled as misleading. 165 A
court may inquire, for example, whether a commercial claim is misleading
because "it unduly emphasizes trivial or relatively uninformative facts."1 66
We are left to wonder what degree of emphasis upon the relatively trivial is
due.
Further muddying the water is that in most deceptive advertising
cases, the crucial question is not whether a given advertising claim is mis-
leading, but whether the presumably misleading claim can fairly be
159. Id. at 566.
160. See Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Business & Professional Regulation, 114 S. Ct. 2084,
2089 n.7 (1994); Edenfield, 113 5. Ct. at 1800; Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S.
60, 71 n.20 (1983).
161. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
162. Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the first Amendment, 56 U.
CIN. L. Rav. 1181, 1192 (1988).
163. Robert Pitofsky, First Amendment Protections and Economic Activity, II GEo. MASON U.
L. REv. 89, 91 (1988).
164. See Robert B. Reich, Preventing Deception in Commercial Speech, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 775,
783 (1979).
165. See Shiffrin, supra note 134, at 1219; see also Gammon v. GC Servs. Ltd. Partnership,
27 F.3d 1254 (7th Cir. 1994) (discussing the inherent unworkability and indeterminacy of
any "least sophisticated consumer" standard in the consumer protection area); Clomon v.
Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1993).
166. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 479 (1988) (citations omitted).
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ascribed to the claimant. 167 The speaker may thus simply dispute the gov-
ernment's interpretation of the meaning or meanings of the ad for partic-
ular audiences. 168
These sorts of complications often are played out through judicial
subdivision of the concept of misleading commercial speech. For exam-
ple, the Court has been known to consider merely whether the speech at
issue is misleading "in the abstract,"169 without explaining what is meant
by such a qualifier. Courts have varied their degree of scrutiny of commer-
cial speech depending upon whether the speech at issue is variously
deemed actually, 170 inherently,1 7 1 potentially, 72 necessarily,' 7 3 demon-
strably, 174 or possibly175 misleading. 176
None of these characterizations, however, bypasses the need for
loosely constrained judgments about the extensiveness, degree, and conse-
quences of misleading speech. In some cases, the misleadingness of the
speech is reducible by means such as a disclaimer. But courts must then
judge, somehow, whether the phrasing, prominence, and clarity of the dis-
claimer are sufficient, or whether the disclaimer, if sufficiently conspicu-
ous, tends unduly to create confusion. 177
Once any issues of misleadingness are somehow resolved, the court
must consider whether the government can identify a substantial interest
167. See Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657, 659 (1985);
see also ITT Continental Baking Co. v. FTC, 532 F.2d 207, 213 (2d Cir. 1976) ("For the most
part the petitioners admitted that Wonder Bread did not have the nutritional qualities al-
leged to have been claimed for it in the challenged advertisements, but they denied that the
advertisements represented that the bread did have those qualities.").
168. See ITT Continental Baking Co., 532 F.2d at 214 ("children below the age of seven
would generally tend to accept the 'fantasy growth sequence' in Wonder Bread advertising as
literal truth"); see also id at 218 ("it is fair to suppose that the commercials in question were
designed to avoid making any specific nutritional misrepresentations while at the same time
conveying the general idea that Wonder Bread would somehow significantly contribute to
growth in children"). Relying on free speech cases from other contexts, though, an adver-
tiser might wish to argue that its free speech rights must not be held hostage to speech
standards appropriate for children. See, e.g., Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957); see
also Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126-27 (1989).
169. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986).
170. Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 111 (1990).
171. Id.
172. Id.; see also Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 472 (1988).
173. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 202 (1982).
174. Id.
175. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13 (1979); SEC v. Wall Street Publishing Inst., Inc.,
851 F.2d 365, 374 n.9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1066 (1988).
176. In addition, different degrees of support are required by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion depending upon whether the commercial claim includes an assertion of support by
scientific tests or not. See Removatron Int'l Corp. v. FTC, 884 F.2d 1489, 1492 n.3 (1st Cir.
1989). Importantly, the FTC then goes on to subdivide the former category into "specific" or"non-specific" claims, usually requiring "two well-controlled scientific studies" in non-specific
claim cases. Id.
177. See id. at 1497. For a case illustrating the indeterminacy of these sorts of inquiries,
see Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 315-16 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1254 (1993)
(discussing the proper characterization of ads relating Kraft Singles to milk and calcium
content).
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underlying the regulation. 178 This is not a trivial inquiry. The govern-
ment's burden in this respect "is not satisfied by mere speculation or con-
jecture; rather, a government body.., must demonstrate that the harms it
recites are real."1 79 Depending upon their degree of sympathy for the
state regulation, courts may identify the interest, or combination of inter-
ests, at stake in more and less favorable ways.180 The idea of "demonstrat-
ing" the reality of a harm is daunting; it is not clear that even a criminal
case requires the prosecutor to "demonstrate" literally the existence of the
charged harm. Whatever the term "demonstrate" is taken to mean, it is
available for use in derailing any reasonable regulation of commercial
speech.
Taken together, the Supreme Court's decisions "leave little insight as
to what criteria the Court used" 18 1 in specifying the relevant state inter-
ests, or in determining their substantiality. The combination of literally
rigorous language and the lack ofjudicial guidance invites litigation of any
governmental regulation of commercial speech. 18 2
The problem is made worse at the next stage of the inquiry, during
which the government must "demonstrate" 183 that the regulation at issue
will "in fact" advance the specified substantial interest "in a direct and ma-
terial way." 18 4 In this context, directness has been associated with "an im-
mediate connection between the prohibition and the government's
asserted end."185 On the other hand, directness has been contrasted vari-
ously with connections that are tenuous, 18 6 highly speculative, 18 7 ineffec-
tive, 188 only remotely supportive of the government interest,18 9
178. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980).
179. Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1800 (1993); see also Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of
Business & Professional Regulation, 114 S. CL 2084, 2089 (1994).
180. For an example of a generous characterization, see Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v.
Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 342 (1986) ("the legislature's interest . .. is not necessarily to
reduce demand for all games of chance, but to reduce [local] demand for casino gam-
bling"). The Court could, of course, have insisted on something like a "substantial" reduc-
tion in casino gambling.
181. Kansas v. United States, 16 F.3d 436, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
182. The Seventh Circuit has noted that "[cioncrete evidence of past effects is likely to be
difficult and expensive, if not impossible, to obtain in most deceptive advertising cases." Na-
tional Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157, 165 (7th Cir. 1977).
183. Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2089; Edenfidd, 113 S. Ct. at 1800; see also Philip B. Kurland,
Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company: " Twas Strange; 'Twas Passing Strange; 'Twos
Pitfu,4 'Tws Wondrous Pitifu", 1986 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 7 (1987) (endorsing a requirement of
demonstrating, as opposed to merely asserting, the efficacy of promoting the government
interest).
184. Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2089; Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1800.
185. Adolph Coors Co. v. Bentsen, 2 F.3d 355, 357 (10th Cir. 1993), cert granted, 114 S.
Ct. 2671 (1994).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980); Cal-Almond Inc. v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 14 F.3d 429, 437 (9th Cir.
1993).
189. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
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conditional,' 9 0 or involving only limited incremental, 19 1 speculative, 192 or
marginal1 93 support for the government interest.19 4
The potential for these concepts, which are largely just opposing end
points on progressive continua, to serve as merely conclusory labels for
opposing outcomes is obvious. More interestingly, the focus on "direct-
ness" or "immediacy" itself seems misconceived. If the idea is taken liter-
ally, why should we care whether the regulation advances the government
interest directly or indirectly, as long as the advancement itself is substan-
tial? The Court's choice of the "directness" terminology is surprising, in
that the Court has, in a famous line of Commerce Clause cases, learned to
focus on the substantiality of relationships, as opposed to their directness
or indirectness. 95
Finally, under Central Hudson the government must show that the reg-
ulation "is not more extensive than is necessary"1 9 6 to promote the govern-
ment interest at stake. Literally, this test would allow courts to strike down
reasonable regulations of commercial speech on the basis of the existence,
real or supposed, of some slightly less restrictive and available alternative
regulation. It need not be difficult for courts to envision such alterna-
tives,' 9 7 with or without 1 9 8 sufficient evidence of their practicality or cost
in other values, including the speech rights of other persons.
In Board of Trustees v. Fox, the Court specified that the "not more ex-
tensive than necessary" requirement was not to be taken literally, in the
sense of a requirement that the government utilize the supposedly least
restrictive means to further the state interest at issue.1 99 While Fox in this
respect lightened the burden on government regulation of commercial
speech, it also required that the costs of the government regulation be"carefully calculated." 20 0 The discretion of judges was then enhanced by
requiring that the reasonableness20 ' of the degree of fit between the gov-
190. Id. at 569.
191. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983).
192. United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2706 (1993).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 152 (1971) (clearly repudiating any
reliance in the commerce clause cases upon the direct versus indirect distinction); NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1937) (distancing itself from reliance on
such a distinction); Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238, 307-08 (1936) (relying upon the
direct versus indirect distinction).
196. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
197. See, e.g., Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 476 (1988) (filing of attorneys'
client solicitation letters with a state agency); In re RM.J., 455 U.S. 191, 206 (1982) (filing
with state of copies of all attorney general mailings); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tour-
ism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 356-57 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (listing wide range of unac-
knowledged alternatives to the state's regulatory scheme); see alsoJohn M. Blim, Comment,
Free Speech and Health Claims Under the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990,88 Nw. U. L.
REy. 733, 766 (1994) (noting the typical judicial assumption that misleading commercial ads
can best be dealt with by mandated warnings and disclosures).
198. See, e.g., In re RM.J., 455 U.S. at 206.
199. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480-81.
200. Id. at 480. But see City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1510
(1993) (placing the burden of proof on the government).
201. See Fox, 492 U.S. at 480.
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ernment interest and the scope of the restriction be determined through a
balancing process. The scope of the restriction must be " 'in proportion
to the interest served.' "202
Thus the current test at this stage invites a judge to determine
whether the scope of the regulation is, through some unspecified measur-
ing process, worth its costs. Whether one restriction is actually more bur-
densome to freedom of speech than some envisioned alternative, however,
may not be clear to begin with. An alternative regulation might affect
more speakers, or affect fewer speakers more severely. The simplest calcu-
lation will involve determining whether some assumedly slight or moder-
ate loss in fulfilling the government interest at stake outweighs, say, some
reduced overall burden on freedom of commercial speech. Trading off
the degree of promotion of a partially indeterminate state interest, under
two alternative regulatory schemes, against the overall degree of burden
on freedom of commercial speech under both regulations simply invites
the expression of a court's predisposition.
The story is thus much the same at every stage of the established judi-
cial test of restrictions on commercial speech. Any court unsympathetic
with any reasonable regulation of commercial speech may, without undue
strain, apply current case law to strike down the regulation at issue.
CONCLUSION
Overall, as a broad cultural institution, commercial speech can more
than take care of itself without special constitutional protection under the
Free Speech Clause. In our cultural context, the broad, often unintended
implications underlying commercial speech are not constrained by any sig-
nificant vector of cultural forces. Reasonable regulations of commercial
speech, whatever their more particular and immediate justifications,
would tend at least minimally to reduce the cultural dominance, within its
sphere, of commercial speech. There is no reason in the Free Speech
Clause not to pursue this course, in which the largely inadvertently ac-
crued power of commercial speech would be fairly reduced for the sake of
greater cultural freedom, and of the values underlying freedom of speech
itself. A democratic government should at least be allowed to accept such
an approach.
Special constitutional protection for commercial speech is thus cur-
rently bad enough. Things could, however, get even worse. Special pro-
tection of commercial speech may make reasonable state and federal
regulation of business enterprises increasingly difficult in a number of ar-
eas, environmental2 0 3 and securities20 4 regulation being merely two exam-
ples. This would simply not be worth the cost in public values. As an
202. Id. (quoting In re R.MJ., 455 U.S. at 203); see also United States v. Edge Broadcasting
Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2708 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting); McHenry v. Florida Bar, 21 F.3d
1038, 1041 (11th Cir.) (scope of restriction must be "in proportion to the interest served"),
cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 42 (1994).
203. See Peter J. Tarsney, Note, Regulation of Environmental Marketing: Reassessing the
Supreme Court's Protection of Commercial Speech, 69 NoTRE DAME L. Ray. 533, 534 (1994) ("The
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admittedly extreme example, since preventing a milk producer from sell-
ing above or below a specified price obviously restricts indirectly that pro-
ducer's accurate commercial speech, conceivably a business might seek to
relitigate classic economic substantive due process cases, such as Nebbia v.
New York,205 under the' Free Speech Clause.
The Supreme Court has of late sought to emphasize the value of com-
mercial speech.20 6 Without arguing that commercial speech is in all cases
to be considered as valuable as political speech, the Court has in some
respects impliedly equated their value. The Court has, for example, held
that a city may not attack problems of safety or aesthetics by limiting only
commercial speech and not political speech if commercial speech is no
more related to the harm or to the state interests than is political
speech. 207
Thus the Court has created something of an Equal Protection Clause,
metaphorically, for commercial speech. Unless commercial speech is
more related to the harm to be regulated than is political speech, it can-
not be disproportionately regulated. But this is actually a curious result.
Imagine a ship that will sink unless two units of weight are jettisoned. On
board are five weight units of commercial speech and five weight units of
political speech. The Supreme Court has, in effect, forbidden us from
tossing two units of commercial speech overboard, thereby saving most of
the commercial speech and all of the political speech.
This result is simply not required by a reasonable view of our reasons
for protecting free speech in the first place, or of our current cultural
circumstances. 20 8 It instead indicates the judicial tendency to protect spe-
cially commercial speech at the expense not only of the purposes underly-
1993 Court raised commercial speech to a level of protection that would likely require courts
to strike down many state environmental statutes.").
204. See Manuel S. Klausner, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 11 Gao. MASON U.
L. Rav. 83, 87 (1988) ("the area of federal securities legislation is ripe for the assertion of first
amendment defenses"); see also Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 226-27 (1985) (White, J., concur-
ring in result) (casting doubt on some SEC regulation of stock market newsletters by unregis-
tered investment advisors); SEC v. Wall Street Publishing Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 371 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1066 (1988).
205. 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding a criminal conviction of Nebbia for selling milk at
prices beyond those permitted by statute). These cases admittedly would involve proposals
for an illegal transaction, but in which the weight of the state's interest in regulating the
underlying transaction could be balanced against the severity of the restriction on commer-
cial speech.
206. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1511 (1993);
see also id. at 1521 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("I hope the Court ultimately will come to
abandon Central Hudson's analysis entirely in favor of one that affords full protection for
truthful, noncoercive commercial speech about lawful activities.").
207. See id. at 1516; see also Graff v. City of Chicago, 9 F.3d 1309, 1319 (7th Cir. 1993)
(noting that under Discovery Network, noise regulation of speech must generally apply equally
to commercial and political speech), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1837 (1994).
208. The Court may, on this basis, eventually reconsider certain other distinctions, in-
cluding its refusal to apply the overbreadth doctrine to commercial speech, or to apply de
novo appellate review to all cases of commercial speech. On the overbreadth issue, see Wa-
ters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1885 (1994) (no application of overbreadth doctrine to
commercial speech); Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 481 (1989) (same); Shapero v.
Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 478 (1988) (same). For discussion of the possible applica-
tion of de novo appellate review to commercial advertising cases, see Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970
1994]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ing freedom of speech in the first place, but of any democratically
expressed view of freedom, well-being, and the proper scope and limits of
purely commercial values.
F.2d 311, 317 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n,
496 U.S. 91, 108 (1990)), cert. deniAd, 113 S. Ct. 1254 (1993).
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